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ral 05/04/87 
May 4, 1987 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Bob 
Nos. 86-1294, 86-1442, Gates v. Doe 
Doe, a homosexual formerly employed by the CIA, was dis-
charged under §102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 
u.s.c. §403(c)(l). That statute provides that the Director of 
the CIA may, "in his discretion, terminate the employment of any 
officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such 
termination necessary or advisabie in the interests of the United --------~ 
States .... " 
CADC held that the Director's decision is reviewable under 
the APA. There is a strong presumption in favor of 
reviewability. Here, the statute sets out a standard, so the 
decision is not one committed to the Director's ~nreviewable dis-
cretion. CADC stated that it would ~eview the Director's deci-
-.-
/ \ \ 
sion under an ~ buse of discretion standard. CADC remanded the 
....._.... -- ....... __ _________ 
case for further proceedings. . Judge Buckley would have held that 
the Director's decision was unreviewable. The . petn for rehearing 
en bane was denied by an equally divided ct. 
I agree with the SG that the reviewability of the Director's 
personnel decisions is an issue of national importance. I also 
am inclined to think that CADC's decision is wrong. But I would 
not grant cert. at this moment. The key issue in this case is 
page 2. 
whether S102(c) precludes review of constitutional claims. 
Resp's non-constitutional claims all have been rejected. The 
Court has said that a statute precluding review of constitutional 
claims would prsent a serious constitutional problem. Bowen v. 
Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 106 S. Ct. 2133, 2141, n. 
12. For this reason, I would al low the case to proceed in the -
DC. The DC may reject resp's constitutional claims. 
~ 
In any 
event, the claims will be better developed. The Di rector does 
not contend that ·any part of the record in this case--except 
. • .,,.,. J 
resp's name--must be kept secret for national security reasons. 
If r~sp does seek to introduce confidential material, the Direc-
tor can invoke the state secrets privilege. 
··' 
I recommend that you vote to DENY. 
May 14, 1987 
Court .................................. . Voted on .......................... , 19 ..... . 
Argued ................................ , 19 ..... . Assigned .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . , 19 .... .. No. 86-1294 
Submitted ............................ , 19 .. .. .. Announced ...................... , 19 .... .. 
HOLD 
FOR 
Rehnquist, Ch. J ........ . 
Brennan, J ................ . 
White, J ................... . 
Marshall, J ................ . 
Blackmun, J. .. .. . .. .. .... . 
Powell, J .................. . 
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Director, CIA (cross-resp) 
Timely 
Timely 
• i ; .. -l 
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1. SUMMARY: Resp is a CIA employee and admitted hanosexual 
----, 
who was discharged pursuant to petr's discretionary power under ------§102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 u.s.c. §403(c)l, 
to discharge employees when he deems such termination "necessary 
or advisable in the interests of the United States .••• " CADC 
held that the termination is reviewable under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) and remanded the case so the DC could 
consider whether resp was discharged for homosexual orientation, 
as opposed to conduct, and if so whether such a discharge is 
constitutional and is "necessary or advisable in the interests of 
the United States." Petr contends that §102(c) precludes 
judicial review, and resp/cross-petr contends that he is entitled 
.I 
---------:> 
to a statement by the Agency of the reason he was deemed a 
security risk. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELCW: Resp began working with the 
CIA in 1973, when he was 17, as a clerk-typist. He eventually 
acquired non-probationary status and was promoted after training 
-----------=--
to a covert position as an electronics technician. Throughout 
his employment resp received acceptable performance ratings. 
lsection 103(c) provides: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7501 of title 5, or 
the provisions of any other law, the Directory of Central 
Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of 
any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he sball deem such 
termination necessary or advisable in the~e United 
States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such 
ofrfcer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other 
department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for 




Resp "became aware of his homosexuality in 1976 and his 
orientation was known to his family and immediate friends." Petn 
App. 61a. On January 28, 1982, resp voluntarily informed a CIA 
---------., 
security officer that he was a homosexual. As a result, the CIA 
-- - ~--· ----· -------,---····--~------··~---i 
placed resp on paid administrative leave on February 2, 1982, 
pending an investigation. On February 12 and 17, resp was 
interviewed at length by a security officer, who later informed 
resp that all his responses tested true, including his statements 
·' 
that he had not had sexual relations with foreign nationals and 
that he had not disclosed classified information to any sexual 
partners. Apparently rei:i'p was unwilling to disclose the names of 
his sexual artners to t~e CIA. 
An Adjudication Report was prepared by the CIA's Office of 
Security and forwarded to then-Director Casey. Resp was allowed 
to preview the report, and he prepared a supplement. Two 
security officers had told resp at the time he was placed on 
\ 
administrative leave that his homosexual activities violated CIA ~ ,. 
regulations, but the then-Deputy General Counsel told resp's 
counsel that hcmosexuality was a security concern that did not 
inevitably result in di srnissal. 
On April 14, 1982, a security officer informed resp that the 
Office of Security had determined that the "circumstances of his 
homosexuality" posed a security threat. Resp sought an 
explanation of why the "circumstances" posed such a threat, but 
his explanation was denied and no further explanation was 
offered. Resp was asked to resign and declined to do so. A 
1 et ter from the Gener al Counsel's staff informed him that then-
• r .. 
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Director Casey "deemed it necessary and advisable in the 
interests of the United States" to terminate resp's employment 
pursuant to §103 (c). The CIA indicated that it would give a 
positive recommendation to any prospective employer, but that if 
resp applied for a job requiring a security clearance he must 
inform the CIA, which would tell the prospective employer that 
petr had been dismissed because his homosexuality posed a 
security threat. 
Resp brought suit in the USDC for the Dist. of Columbia, 
alleging that petr had dismissed him for his homosexuality and 
that his discharge violated the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 9th 
Amendments, the APA, and §102(c). Resp sought reinstatement or, 
alternatively, reinstatement to administrative leave, 
reconsideration of his status as a security risk, and various 
procedural protections, such as a statement of the reasons for 
any future dismissal and an opportunity to contest any adverse 
final determination. The DC granted partial summary judgment for 
resp, finding that the CIA did not follow its own regulations in 
dismissing him. The DC rejected petr's argument that §102(c) 
precludes review of the Director's decision under the APA. 
Petr appealed, and a divided CADC vacated the DC's judgment 
and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court 
rejected petr's contention that the decision to terminate resp is 
not reviewable under the APA. Section lO(a) of the APA, 5 u.s.c. 
§701 (a), prov ides that agency act ion is rev iewabl e "except to the 
extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency 




creates a strong presumption of reviewability, see Bowen v. 
Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 106 s.ct. 2133 (1986), and 
for review to be precluded by statute, there must be clear and 
convincing evidence (though not in a rigid evidentiary sense) 
that such was Congress' intent. Block v. Community Nutrition 
Institution, 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984). CADC stated that this 
Court "has never found a congressional intent to preclude review 
when the statute at issue specifies a standard that at least 
purports to limit agency discretion." Petn App. lOa. Also, 
while this Court has at times inferred an intent to preclude 
review from the statutory scheme, see, e.g., Block v. Community 
Nutrition Institutio~, supra, such an approach has been limited 
to cases involving uniquely complex or otherwise delicately 
balanced statutory schemes. The court concluded that (1) the 
language of §102(c) cannot be fairly read to preclude judicial 
review, (2) the legislative history is silent on the issue, and 
(3) most importantly, the fact that the statute provides a 
standard--namely, the termination must be "necessary or advisa~i 
in the interests of the United States"--is compelling evidence 
that Congress did not intend to preclude review. The fact that 
§102(c) begins with the phrase "Notwithstanding the provisions of 
section 7501 of title 5, or the provisions of any other law," 
does not prevent the application of all law; instead, §102(c) 
merely replaces one set of standards--the more rigorous 
efficiency standard normally applied to the termination of 
federal employees--with a new, more relaxed standard: that the 
termination be "necessary or advisable in the interests of the 
. .. 
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United States." The only legislative material that supports 
petr's view that Congress intended to preclude judicial review is 
Senate Report No. 77, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (the Report), 
written decades after §102(c) was enacted, which incorrectly 
states that courts have interpreted §102 (c) as giving unlimi tea 
discretion to the Director. As contrary authority, CADC cited 
its prior decision in Torpats v. McCone, 300 F.2d 914, 915, cert. 
denied, 371 U.S. 886 (1962), which did not refuse review of the 
termination of a CIA employee, but upheld it as within the 
authority conferred on the Director by Congress. CADC concluded 
that the Report is irrelevant to Congressional intent in 1947. 
CADC next rejected petr's contention that terminations under 
§102(c) are committed to the Director's unreviewable discretion. 
To prevail on this argument, the Government must establish that 
"'the statute is so drawn that a court would have no meaningful 
standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of 
discretion,'" Petn App. 15a (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 105 s.ct. 
1649, 1655 (1985). Here, there is a meaningful standard: the 
termination must be "necessary or advisable in the interests of 
the United States." While courts "[o] bviously must give 
great deference to the [Director's] judgment," judicial review is 
nonetheless appropriate. Petn App. 16a. CADC stated: 
"Without doubt, for example, the Director could 
not terminate Black employees simply because they are 
black •.•• Indeed, Government counsel conceded at oral 
argument that the agency was not prepared to say that 
-7-
constitutional claims, or even claims that the Director 
acted in excess of his or her statutory authority, are 
precluded from review." Id. at 16a-17a. 
Additionally, section"""l02(c) requires that an 
employee be terminated ~nl~ if the termination advances 
the interests of the Unite States. Although the court 
cannot second-guess the Di rector's decision that the 
termination of an employee is advisable in the interest 
of the United States, we must at least satisfy 
ourselves that the termination has some relationship to 
the interests of the United States. 1r--rd., at 16a-17a. 
CADC rejected the DC's conclusion that resp's termination 
violated CIA regulations. This holding is not at issue in the 
petn and it is mentioned only in passing in the cros1:1-petn, p. 
10, so I will not describe the court's reasoning in detail. 
The court stated that it would review the Director's 
decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard. It recognized 
that the Director's decisions are "'worthy of great deference 
given the magnitude of the national security interests and 
potential risks at stake,'" and particularly so because"' [i]t is 
conceivable that the mere explanation of why information must be 
withheld can convey valuable information to a foreign 
intelligence agency.'" Id., at 23a-24a (quoting CIA v. Sims, 105 
s.ct. 1881, 1893 (1985)). 
The court considered three possible reasons for petr's 
action, and indicated how it would deal with each. First, if 
petr intended to invoke §102 (c) for reasons other than resp' s 
homosexuality, and without stating a reason, resp has the burden 
of showing concrete evidence that §102(c) is being used as a 
sham. Resp has produced no such evidence, and cannot prevail in 
the unlikely event that the DC determines that "the Director 
intended to invoke §102(c) without [giving any] reasons in this 
; 
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case .... " Petn App. 26a. Second, petr may have acted pursuant 
to a CIA policy barring the employment of all homosexuals. CADC 
stated that while homosexual conduct is not constitutionally 
protected, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986), it is 
arguably a constitutional violati on to discriminate on the basis 
of homosexual orientation alone. "At the very least, the CIA 
would have to justify why such a ban on the employment of all 
homosexuals was 'necessary or advisable in the interests of the 
United States."' Petn App. 27a. '.!'_hird, petr may have terminated 
resp because his homosexuality presents a security risk. CADC 
did not believe that this would present a colorable substantive 
constitutional claim, but found resp to have an arguable claim 
that the CIA deprived him of his liberty interest in reputation 
without due process. However, the court reviewed the process 
accorded resp, and concluded that he had had an adequate 
opportunity to contest any allegation that his homosexuality 
presented a security risk. 
Concurring and dissenting, Judge Buckley agreed that resp 
had received due process and that resp's discharge did not 
violate CIA regulations, but would have held that the Director's 
decision is unreviewable under the APA. Judge Buckley faulted 
the majority for concluding that because the absence of standards 
implies unreviewability, see Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 
1655 (1985), the presence of standards necessarily implies 
reviewability. Also, he rejected the majority's view that intent 
to preclude judicial review can be inferred from the statutory 
scheme only when it is complex. He concluded that the risk of 
-9-
compromising national security through judicial intrusion weighs 
against granting review under the APA. 
Judge Buckley found the "notwithstanding" clause of §102(c) 
clear evidence that Congress intended to prohibit judicial 
review. Section 102(c) was enacted at a time when federal 
personnel actions were not subject to judicial review. See 
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 406 (1976) .2 Congress had 
adopted the Lloyd-LaFollette ict granting federal employees 
limited employment and procedural questions, but §102(c) stripped 
CIA employees of even these limited protections. It makes no 
sense to believe that Congress nonetheless intended to preserve a 
right to judicial review. The majority errs in reading §102(c) 
to require that the termination be in the national interest: all 
the statute requires is that the Director deem the termination to 
be in the national interest. A court may properly inquire 
whether the Director made such a determination, but it may not 
inquire whether such a determination was correct. Judge Buckley 
was also unable to agree with the majority that a CIA policy 
against employing homosexuals would constitute even an arguable 
violation of the constitution. He found no need to ranand for 
consideration whether the Director acted within his statutory 
authority, since the Director's affidavit establishes that he 
discharged resp on the ground that this was necessary and 
advisable in the interests of the United States. 
2section 102(c) was enacted in 1947, after the passage of the 
APA in 1946. The cases cited in United States v. Testan for the 
proposition that federal personnel actions were long held not 
subject to judicial review date from the turn of the century. 
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Concurring, Judge Ginsburg pointed out that the majority and 
partial dissent agree on two points: (1) courts do not sit to 
review the wisdom of the Director's determinations on security 
matters, and (2) courts may inquire whether the Director acted 
within his statutory authority. The apparent difference is that 
the partial dissent "would not necessarily extend court review to 
the Director's compliance with the nation's highest law." Petn 
App. 33a. 
A petn for rehearing en bane was denied by an equally 
divided vote (5-5), with Judges Bork, Starr, Silberman, Buckley, 
and Williams voting to rehear. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that "[t]his case presents a 
question of exceptional national importance regarding the ability 
of the Director of Central Intelligence to maintain the 
confidentiality of the Agency's personnel policies and actions." 
Petn 10. The text of §102(c) shows that the Director's decisions 
are unreviewable: he is given "discretion" to dismiss "any" 
officer or employee "whenever he shall deem such termination 
necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States." 
Cf., e.g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 165 (1948) (Alien 
Enemy Act of 1798, granting the President power to exclude alien 
enemies, precludes judicial review). Petr repeats all of the 
points made below by Judge Buckley and adds that any disclosure 
of CIA personnel practices compromises security. 
While this Court has stated that a "serious constitutional 
problem" would be presented by a statute that precludes review of 
constitutional claims, Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family 
-11-
Physicians, 106 s.ct. 2133, 2141, n. 12 (1986), petr argues that 
the question must be faced in this case. Section 102(c) does not 
distinguish between constitutional and nonconstitutional claims. 
The statute's complete preclusion of judicial review is 
constitutional because it serves the paramount interest in 
national security and is limited to the narrow circumstances of 
termination of a voluntary employment relationship with the CIA. 
Petr argues that the decision below is inconsistent with · 
several prior CADC decisions. See, e.g., Service v. Dulles, 235 
F.2d 215, 218 (CADC), rev'd on other grounds, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) 
(in reviewing discharge pursuant to grant of authority to 
Secretary of State to terminate "in his absolute discretion" any 
employee "whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or 
advisable in the interests of the United States," a court's 
function is limited to determining whether any procedural 
requirement of the statute was violated). The decision below 
also conflicts with Baker v. United States, 224 Ct. Cl. 760 
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981). In Baker, CIA 
employees discharged as part of a reduction in force under a 
regulation implementing §102(c) argued, inter alia, that their 
discharge was for reasons other than the interests of the United 
States and in violation of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944. 
'!be Court of Claims held that the plaintiffs had failed to state 
a claim because §102(c) gave the Director "the absolute right to 
terminate any employee whenever he deemed it necessary or 
advisable. " I a. , at 76 2 ( internal quotations omit tea) • Baker is 
current authority because the CAFC has adopted Ct. of Claims 
-12-
decisions as precedent. The conflict is significant because 
former CIA employees seeking back pay must litigate before the 
CAFC. 
Resp argues that the only real question presented by this 
case is whether §102(c) precludes review of a constitutional 
claim, since his constitutional claim is all that remains to be 
resolved on remand. The Government is arguing for the first time 
before this Court that §102(c) precludes review of constitutional 
claims; below, it conceded the issue. See Petn App. 17a. It is 
best to let the remand proceed; the issue of the reviewability of 
constitutional claims may "disappear" if the DC determines that 
on the facts of this case resp has no constitutional claim. 
Resp also argues that petr exaggerates the importance of the 
decision below to national security. With the exception of 
resp' s name, the CIA has never contended that any part of the 
record is classified or otherwise requires confidential 
treatment. If confidential material were implicated, the 
Director could invoke the state secrets privilege. See United 
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). Complaints that adverse 
personnel actions are unconstitutional have been dismissed when 
the government could not, for reasons of security, disclose the 
reasons for its actions. Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815 (CADC 
1984). Furthermore, the CIA is subject to suit under Title VII, 
see, e.g., Brown v. Turner, 490 F. Supp. 939 {D.D.C. 1980), 
aff'd, 659 F.2d 1199 {CADC 1981), and this suit does not expose 
the CIA to any qualitatively different litigation than it already 
faces under Title VII. The decision below is distinguishable 
-13-
from Baker v. United States, 224 Ct. Cl. 760 (1980), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981) because no constitutional claim was 
raised in Baker. Finally, resp argues that the decision below is 
correct, for much the same reasons stated by· the panel majority. 
In the Cross-Petn, resp/cross-petr seeks a conditional grant 
on the question whether he is entitled to a statement of reasons 
for the Agency's determination that his homosexuality creates a 
security risk. Resp/cross-petr points out that the CIA never 
asserted that it withheld from him the Office of Security's 
adjudication on the ground that disclosure would create a 
security risk. The decision below is allegedly inconsistent with 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, which 
holds that an employee with a property interest in continued 
employment has the right, prior to termination, to "oral or 
written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the 
employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of 
the story." Id., at 546 .3 Also, 5 u.s.C.§555(e) provides that a 
person subject to informal agency adjudication is entitled to 
know the reasons for the agency's proposed action. '!be decision 
below inverted the usual rule of constitutional and 
administrative law by giving resp the burden of showing that the 
Agency's determination was improper before the Agency had to 
explain its actions. 
3Resp contends that CADC failed to address his claim that he 
had a property interest in continued employment. Petn in No. 86-
1442, at 5. Petr/cross-resp argues that CADC implicitly rejected 
that claim. Memorandum in Opposition in No. 86-1442, p. 3, n. 2. 
. . -· .. 
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Petr/cross-resp argues that the cross-petn should be denied 
because it presents neither a conflict nor a signficant 
constitutional or statutory question, for the following reasons: 
(1) Loudermill is inapposite because petr is not a tenured 
employee. (2) CADC correctly held that petr received all the 
process that is due with respect to any liberty interest he has 
in protecting his reputation. (3) The Director should not be 
required to justify nondisclosure of the reasons for termination 
on a case-by-case basis, because this could itself compromise 
security. (4) Title 5 u.s.c. §555(e) does not apply to decisions 
regarding selection or tenure of an employee, because under 5 
u.s.c. §554(a) (2), such a decision is not an adjudication, and a 
decision regarding selection or tenure of an employee doesn't fit 
any other class of agency proceedings as defined by 5 u.s.c. 
§§551(5), (7), (9), and (12). Moreover, it would be illogicc1l to 
apply the procedural protections of §555(e) when §102(c) 
explicitly withholds similar procedural protections provided by 
the civil service laws. (5) Resp/cross-petr' s reliance on CIA 
regulations is frivolous: the regulations expressly preserve the 
Director's discretion under §102 (c) to remove an employee 
summarily without a statement of reasons. 
4. DISClJSSION: Petr has fairly strong arguments and the 
issue is obviously important. The decision below is in tension, 
though not square conflict, with Baker v. United States, 224 Ct. 
Cl. 760 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981). Although 
Baker was not an APA case and did not involve constitutional 
-15-
claims, it supports the view that terminations under §102 (c) are 
exempt from j udi ci al s er ut i ny. 
One argument for denial is that the issues left for remand 
---- --are resp's constitutional claims, and petr did not argue below 
that §102(c) precludes judicial review of such claims. See Petn 
App. 17a. Whether the Court should bypass the usual requirement 
that an argument presented here have been presented below depends 
on a judgment call as to how how immediate a threat to national 
security CADC' s decision poses. I have no expertise on that 
point. Petr, who is expert, claims that the issue is one of 
"exceptional public importance," but does not state that the 
remand in this case immediately threatens national security. 
Resp makes a fairly persuasive argument that on remai:_id petr can 
still assert a privilege for any matter whose disclosure would 
compromise security. If resp prevails on remand the Court can 
always take the case at that juncture. Also, if resp loses on 
remand and another suit 1 ike this one is brought, petr could 
probably bring the issue of reviewability up on an interlocutory 
appeal. Cf. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985) ("the 
denial of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order 
appealabl e before final judgment") • Under these circumstances, 
denying cert is a reasonable option. That is my recommendation. 
But it can also be reasonably argued that the case is incorrectly 
decided and the issue important enough to consider an argument 
not presented below. If the Court grants No. 86-1294, a grant in 
the cross-petn should not consm1e overmuch time, although I doubt 
that petr would prevail on the cross-petn. 
-16-
5. RECOMMENDATION: Deny. 
There is a response. 
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86-1294 Gates, Acting Director of CIA v. Doe 
Dear Byron: 
Please add my name to your dissent from denial of 
cert, circulated by you on May 27. 
I am not unaware that I changed m'J original vote at 
the last Conference, acting on my understanding then that 
because of CADC's remand to the District Court its decision 
was not final. Your dissent, plus more careful consider-
ation of the case, makes clear that on the question whether 
the Director of the CIA has unreviewable discretion to dis-
charge an employee, the decision of CADC is final. 
This is an important question implicating national 
security, and I now think we should resolve it. 
Justice White 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
I 
Court .................................. . Voted on .......................... , 19 ..... . 
Argued ................................ , 19 ..... . Assigned ......................... , 19 ..... . 
Submitted ............................ , 19 ..... . Announced ...................... , 19 ..... . 
GATES, ACTING DIR.,. CIA 
vs. 
DOE 
DEFER CERT. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT MERITS HOLD 
FOR 
RELIST CVSG G I/ D G&R N POST DIS AFF REV AFF 
Rehnquist, Ch. J.. . . . . . . . . .......... . !.. . 
7
~ ..... ...................... . 
Brennan, J ................. , ........... . 7 .................................. . White, J . .................................... . 7 ...... ............ ...... .. ........ . 
Marshall, J ................................. ··i7~····· ............ ...... .. ........ . 
Blackmun, J ............... , ........... / ............ ............ .. ....... . 
Powell, J ................................... ".;/"""' ................................. . 
Stevens, J. . . .. .. .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . . . . .. .. .. .. . ..j ....... .. .. .. . . .. .. . . .. .. . . .. . .. ........ . 
O'Connor, J ........................... ·· / ............................................ .. 
Scalia, J.............. .. .. .. . .. ......... Y.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ................... . 












~ _ i ~- Justice Stevens 
~ ~·---r Justice O'Connor IL~~ 
hu-~hr~ 
Justice Scalia 
From: Justice White 
~ h,., ~ C I fl Pj A--- Circulated: MAY 2 7 1987 
~. ~ ~~~ -------
1st DRAFT rVZ.---1: t_f- ./..€)  ~ 
\ 
'' ~ ~ LA.t._ tz:µ.J tr1 ~ lt .S 
SUPREME COURT OF fflE UNITED STATES , 
ROBERT M. GATES, ACTING DIRECTOR OF CEN- 7)u_,,_ ~ ~ 
TRAL INTELLIGENCE v. JOHN DOE ~ a-t__. 
2 
~ 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED ~
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ~ ~ . (° /J ~ 
No. 86-1294. Decided June-, 1987 ( ::Z _I) ~ 1-4._ 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. . ~ qJ ~ ~ 
The respondent in this case was discharged by petitioner, . 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, on account //lu. d.. _.-,. -1,..,~ 
of acknowledged homosexuality. The Director stated that d~ 
1 
he considered it "necessary and advisable in the interests of ~ L-<.A, ' ~ 
the United States" to terminate respondent, which he did/JA" h~,,.. .... 1  
pursuant to his power under Section 102(c) of the Nationaf ' -- ~ - - " 
Security Act of 1947, 50 U. S. C. § 403(c). * Respondent £A......-" 
sought judicial review, alleging that his discharge violated 
various statutory and constitutional provisions. The Dis-~ A-~ 
trict Court granted relief, holding that petitioner had vio- . ,. 
lated the CIA's own regulations in discharging respondents.ct 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dis- Al / . I _1' 
agreed with this holding, but a majority of the p~lso re-h A.>'--'-- ~ 
jecteE_ petitioner's contention that Section 102(c) precludes ~ 
judic~ r~w un er t e mm1strative Procedure Act, 5 
U. S. C. § 702 et seq. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals re-
l 
mantled the case so that the District Court could consider 
whether petitioner has a policy of discharging all persons 
with homosexual orientation, and if so, whether such a policy 
is constitutional. 
*Section 102(c) provides in relevant part: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7501 of title 5, or the provi-
sions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his 
discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the 
Agency whenever he shall dee such termination necessq or advisable in 
the interests o the United States .... 
j OtV' I ') 
.. 
2 GATES v. DOE 
The decision below is in tension with Baker v. United 
States, 224 Ct. CL 760 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 1040 
(1981), which held that CIA employees challenging their dis-
charge under § 102(c) on statutory grounds failed to state a I 
claim because § 102(c) gives the Director" 'the absolute right 
to terminate any employee whenever he deem[s] it necessary 
or advisable."' Id., at 762 (quoting Rhodes v. United States, 
156 Ct. CL 31, 36, cert. denied, 371 U. S. 821 (1962)). More-
over, the decision below may affect the Director's ability to 
maintain secrecy in national security matters, a matter of 
utmost concern. I respe..9tfully dissent from the denial of 
certiorari. 
; 
